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ABSTRACT
HIDDEN OWNERSHIP, MONITORING,
AND THE VALUE OF THE FIRM
Roy Shashua
Itay Goldstein
This paper analyzes the effect of market transparency on firm value and social surplus.
I investigate the incentives of large investors to publicly disclose their economic interests,
as well as to monitor management. I find that when markets are sufficiently liquid, large
investors will tend to forgo share ownership in favor of “hidden ownership” - alternative
forms of economic exposure not subject to disclosure regulations. The resulting uncertainty
regarding the extent of investor exposure to firm performance can better align management’s
incentives with shareholder interests, thereby increasing firm value and social surplus, even
when management displays risk neutral preferences. A transparent market may therefore
become a liability from both the shareholder and social planner perspectives.

v

Contents

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

CHAPTER 1 :

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

CHAPTER 2 :

MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

CHAPTER 3 :

ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

3.1

Transparent regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

3.2

Hidden regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

3.3

The effect of trading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

3.4

Choice of regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

CHAPTER 4 :

TOTAL SURPLUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

CHAPTER 5 :

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

vi

List of Tables

TABLE 1 :

Order Flows and Market Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

16

List of Figures

FIGURE 1 :

Timeline of the model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

6

CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Is transparency a desirable quality of the market for corporate control? The prevailing
doctrine asserts that a transparent market protects investors by providing them the relevant
information required to accurately assess the effect of a firm’s ownership structure on its
share price.1 This rationale has prompted regulators in the U.S. and abroad to enact
rules requiring investors holding a significant stake in a firm to disclose their ownership.2
Similarly, on a theoretical level, Fama’s (1970) taxonomy of financial markets based on
their level of transparency has in effect made transparency synonymous with efficiency. In
recent years, however, mounting evidence suggests that investors are increasingly employing
novel strategies in an effort to sidestep disclosure regulations.3 Non-disclosure provides
an informational advantage to its practitioners, and the recent trend alludes to the profit
potential this advantage confers. As regulators are scrambling to plug what they consider to
be loopholes by extending the scope of existing disclosure regulations, it may be worthwhile
to pause and ask whether the enduring pursuit of absolute transparency is in fact improving
shareholder and total welfare, or are astute investors on to a tactic that can benefit more
than just their personal worth.
This paper provides an analytical framework in which to evaluate the claim that transparency promotes the efficiency of corporate governance and argues that it may in fact
become a liability from both the shareholder and social planner perspectives. The model
presented analyzes the decision making process of an activist investor (with regard to ownership disclosure and monitoring) as well as that of the firm’s management (concerning
expropriation of funds for private benefit) and compares firm value and social surplus under two scenarios: one in which the ownership structure is fully transparent and the other
1

“In general terms, the ideal is a market...in which...investors can choose among the securities that
represent ownership of firms’ activities under the assumption that security prices at any time fully reflect
all available information”. Fama (1970)
2
In the U.S., SEC rule 13D puts the threshold at 5%. See Securities Exchange Act, Rule 13-d, Schedule
13D, 17 C.F.R. 240. 13d-l, 240. 13d-7 (1986).
3
See Hu and Black (2007) and Brav and Mathews (2011)

1

in which investors can choose to disguise their interest in the firm (henceforth referred to
as the “hidden ownership” regime).4 The analysis shows that the information asymmetry
introduced by hidden ownership can act in two distinct dimensions to alleviate frictions inherent to the corporate governance mechanism, thereby improving firm value and even social
surplus. The first dimension concerns the dynamic between the activist investor and other
shareholders: Grossman and Hart (1980) have shown that in a fully transparent market,
value-enhancing initiatives will be hampered due to the free-rider problem. Hidden ownership can provide the required incentive that will make such an undertaking worthwhile: it
allows activist investors to trade and augment their interest in the firm without conceding
the rewards for their actions to other shareholders. The second dimension revolves around
the ever present agency problem at the heart of the investor - management dynamic: One of
the main results of the paper is that in the face of uncertainty regarding the scale of investor
activism it faces, even a risk-neutral management will tend to better-align its actions with
the interests of its shareholders.
The paper also examines the role and effect of liquidity in this setting. The analysis shows
that liquidity and hidden ownership create a complementarity in which each enables the
other to contribute to firm value and social surplus. Liquidity combines with hidden ownership to facilitate gains from informed trading, mitigating the free-rider problem. In this role,
it acts to make the hidden ownership regime a more likely equilibrium outcome.5 Under this
regime, the informed trading that liquidity enables increases the uncertainty management
faces regarding activism even further, making its effect even more dominant. Thus, the
hidden regime provides liquidity an additional channel through which it can have a positive
impact on firm value and social surplus.
One of the primary channels by which shareholders can mitigate the agency problems and
4

Following Hu and Black (2005) I employ the term ”hidden ownership” to refer to the array of investor
strategies involving non-disclosure.
5
Maug (1998) Presents a somewhat similar result in which liquidity mitigates the free-rider problem.
This model adds a new source of information asymmetry that works together with liquidity towards the
same end.
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conflicts of interest inherent to public companies is often termed in the literature as “monitoring”.6 This term is generally used to describe a combination of costly efforts exerted
by shareholders, directed at some form of information acquisition, and the exercise of their
mandate - in light of this information - to affect the course charted by management and hold
it accountable for its actions. Monitoring is perhaps the principal mechanism with which
management is kept in check, and can be extremely efficient if its application is credible,
since the implications of its use are taken into account by management before any decisions
concerning the firm are made. Recognized for its importance, it has been a prominent feature in much of the literature, and as such has been modeled in many different variations.
In virtually all those variations one implicit assumption is always present: monitoring is
performed solely by shareholders, as they alone have the incentive to exert effort in order
to exercise their voting power well. While Stock ownership is composed of both economic
exposure and voting power, only the former ingredient is necessary in order to induce its
bearer to exert an effort directed at improving firm value. The obvious example for such a
setup is the derivatives market: an investor holding a significant ’long’ position in derivative
instruments has an incentive to exert an effort (such as monitoring) if that effort is likely
to increase the value of the underlying asset.
One might argue that an investor holding only derivatives of public company shares lacks the
authority to affect change. However, in many cases, it may be enough to share information
with legitimate shareholders in order to motivate them to take action. In other cases, a
position comprised of derivatives can be quickly and discretely morphed into an equivalent
position in actual shares, conferring the required authority to the investor.7 This ’de-facto’
ownership is typically not disclosed under large shareholder disclosure rules. These rules
focus on voting power rather than economic interest, and so allow investors to plausibly deny
6

See Grossman and Hart (1980); Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
A common practice for the the broker taking the short side of the derivatives contract (vis--vis the
investor) is to hedge its exposure using the underlying asset. It is often willing to accommodate its client by
voting the shares used as a hedge according to the client’s wish. The investor can also gain access to voting
rights by ending its derivatives contract at any time and buying these shares from the broker, as the latter
no longer needs them. This transaction can be done off the market, without affecting the market price and
without revealing any information.
7
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the voting power that would trigger disclosure. The derivative markets supply investors,
therefore, with an opportunity to disguise their specific interests while conveying virtually
all of the advantages of share ownership. Investors are now coming to realize this, making
this form of ’hidden ownership’ increasingly popular.
Since this practice is covert by nature, gauging its prevalence is a challenging task. Hu and
Black (2006a) compiled a list containing dozens of recent examples, but perhaps the most
compelling evidence regarding the expanding scale of this phenomena can be found in the
response of regulators around the world: In 2011, the Financial Times reported that the
SEC began to take a stricter stance on derivatives disclosure.8 Also, in 2012, the French
Parliament voted to extend the scope of existing shareholding disclosure rules to include
positions held through derivative instruments which give rise to a long position on the
economic performance of underlying shares.
While the practice of hidden ownership has been documented before, this is the first paper
employing a well defined theoretical framework to examine its effects. At at period when
increased regulation is frequently mentioned as a cure to many of the financial system’s
shortcomings, I offer a somewhat contrasting view, bringing to light a practice novel to
the corporate governance financial literature. The literature closest in nature to my own
includes Kahn and Winton (1998) and Maug (1998). I follow the methodology presented
in the latter, with obvious departures in order to accommodate the introduction of the
emerging hidden ownership phenomena.9

8

SEC takes stricter line on derivatives disclosure, Financial Times, November 6, 2011.
My contribution also includes an arguably more realistic representation of firm value as a continuous
function of monitoring intensity, whereas related papers have employed a binary variable. This adds a
dynamic dimension to the analysis.
9
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CHAPTER 2 : Model
Consider a single firm, with one share outstanding. The firm has no assets in place but
the projects it is currently undertaking are expected to produce a net positive cash flow
normalized to one. Atomistic shareholders collectively own all of the firm. The firm’s
manager (M ) can choose to divert a fraction 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 of this cash flow for private benefit,
at the expense of all shareholders. An Investor (D) initially holds a position (determined
exogenously) in derivatives that gives her an economic exposure equivalent to the ownership
of a fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the firm’s outstanding shares. D’s exposure to the firm’s value
motivates her to exert a monitoring effort 0 ≤ e ≤ 1, at a cost of 12 ce2 .
Because the disclosure of hidden ownership is voluntary, public filings regarding the firm’s
ownership structure no longer provide an accurate reflection of its potential monitors. In
order to capture the uncertainty management faces regarding monitoring intensity, I assume
M believes that D is of one of two possible, equally likely investor types i ∈ {1, 2}, differing
only with respect to their (publicly known) monitoring cost parameter ci . W.l.o.g., assume
c1 < c2 . Also assume that D1 , facing a lower cost of monitoring, has an initial hidden
ownership at least as large as that of D2 (generally, α1 ≥ α2 ). The mechanism enabling
hidden ownership is discussed in the introduction - here I simply assume D has the privilege
of choosing whether to disclose her position or not. Disclosure of investor position is assumed
to be verifiable, and reveals not only the investor’s position but also their identity and in
effect their type. All agents are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate is normalized to zero.
There are four periods, summarized in Figure 1. At t = 1, Nature randomly chooses D’s
type (i) to be 1 or 2 with equal probability. At this point, Di has the option of voluntarily
disclosing her position (and implicitly - her type). At t = 2, M chooses the fraction b of
the firm’s cash flow to divert for private benefit. M ’s marginal utility from diverted funds
is assumed to be decreasing in the magnitude of b. When choosing b, M takes into account
the expected monitoring effort exerted by the investor he faces. At t = 3 markets open,

5

t=1

t=2

t=3

t=4

Nature chooses investor

Manager diverts frac-

Market opens.

Investor

type i ∈ {1, 2}.

tion b of cash flow.

Liquidity shock hits.

monitors

Trading takes place.

with

Investor chooses
whether to hide/disclose

intensity e.

her ownership.

Firm value
is realized.

Figure 1. Timeline of the model.

and a liquidity shock that is correlated across households hits the atomistic shareholders.1
In particular, there is a probability of 1/2 that a fraction 0 < η < 1 of households will be
subject to such a shock and sell their shares as a result. Therefore:

with probability 1/2, no households will sell their shares.
with probability 1/2, a fraction η of households will sell their shares.

Note that there is an ex-ante probability of η/2 for any household to be affected by the
shock. At this time, Di can also submit a long/short trade to try and capture some of the
potential gains stemming from her private information regarding her type.2 All orders are
submitted to a competitive market maker who then sets a price P at which to fulfill the
orders. P reflects the market maker’s expectation of firm value conditional on the aggregate
order flow he observes. At t = 4, Di monitors at her chosen intensity ei , incurring a cost
1
2
2 ci ei .

Monitoring is defined as a directed effort to detect misappropriation of funds by M , as
well as the recovery of those funds when detection is successful. The choice of monitoring
intensity e is directly affected by the magnitude of Di ’s position (measured by αi ), as well
1

The structure of the market is similar to that in Kyle (1985). See Dow and Gorton (1994) and Bernhardt
et al. (1995) for a discrete version of the model. Also see Krishnan (1992) regarding the equivalence of the
Kyle and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) models.
2
The informational advantage gained from hidden ownership can encourage investors to trade and increase
their economic exposure, providing an incentive for further information gathering and thus mitigating the
free-rider problem to the benefit of all shareholders.

6

as by the monitoring cost ci she faces and her beliefs about the magnitude b of misappropriation. Higher monitoring intensity implies a higher probability of detection, and e is also
interpreted to be the probability with which detection is successful (if in fact M engaged
in misappropriation of funds). If monitoring is successful, the diverted funds are recovered
and M faces a pecuniary penalty equal to 21 b2 . Finally, firm value is realized.

7

CHAPTER 3 : Analysis
In order to assess the effects of hidden ownership on firm value and social welfare, consider
two scenarios: one in which hidden ownership is not possible (“Transparent Regime”),
and the other in which it is (“Hidden Regime”). With sub-game perfection as a solution
concept, I use backward induction to first solve for the equilibrium levels of e and b under
each regime, assuming an exogenously determined initial position (in derivatives) for the
investor. To examine the effect liquidity has on firm value, the analysis includes a baseline
scenario in which no trading takes place at time t = 3. Next, I analyze the investor’s
initial decision regarding choice of regime. Finally, I compare the effects each regime has
on aggregate welfare loss, and derive the optimal distribution of investor positions from a
social planner’s perspective.1

3.1. Transparent regime
The investor’s portfolio allocation at the initial stage is taken as given. When there is no
possibility2 for Di to hide her position, or if she chooses to disclose it voluntarily, M can
correctly deduce her type , and therefore the level of monitoring effort ei he will face. As a
result, M ’s response to ei will be the optimal response bi where generally b1 6= b2 .
M ’s utility specification involves only two straightforward assumptions: (i) The marginal
utility derived from private benefits is decreasing in the size of the benefits. (ii) The penalty
for misappropriation of company funds is commensurate with (squarely proportional to) the
amount diverted. This specification results in a optimality condition for bi that is linear in
ei . A desirable characteristic of such a specification is that the results obtained throughout
this analysis continue to hold for any specification resulting in an optimality condition for
b that is weakly concave in e (a linear relation being the limiting case). M ’s program is
1

Regime choice affects (and is affected by) the agency and free-rider related frictions that are inherent to
corporate governance.
2
The transparent regime can be enforced by regulations requiring disclosure of derivative positions conferring significant economic exposure. Alternatively, limiting investors to holding only shares (which are
already subject to ownership disclosure regulations) achieves the same effect.
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given by:

trans
UM
=

(1 − ei ) · (bi −

M ax
bi

b2
b2i
) − ei · i
2
2

(3.1)

where the monitoring intensity ei can be interpreted as the probability of successful monib2
toring, (bi − i ) is M ’s (marginally decreasing) utility from successfully diverting a fraction
2
b2
b of the firm’s cash flow, and i is the pecuniary equivalent of the penalty he faces in case
2
monitoring is successful.
This specification yields the following optimality condition:

bi = 1 − ei .

(3.2)

As expected, higher monitoring intensity exerted by Di will result in a smaller fraction of
funds being diverted. Since the diversion of bi will only go undetected a fraction (1 − ei ) of
the time, the expected firm value loss (Ltrans ) under each type is (1 − ei )2 . Assuming both
types are equally likely, expected firm value loss firm value under this regime is:

E[Ltrans ] =

(1 − e1 )2 + (1 − e2 )2
.
2

(3.3)

When deciding on the optimal monitoring intensity, Di takes into account her exposure to
the firm’s value, as well as the monitoring cost she faces:

trans
UD
=
i

M ax
ei

αi ((1 − ei )(1 − bi ) + ei · 1) −

ci e2i
2

(3.4)

where αi denotes the measure of exposure (equivalent to ownership of a fraction αi of the

9

firm’s shares) Di has to firm value.
Eq. 3.4 yields the following optimal monitoring intensity:

ei =

αi bi
.
ci

(3.5)

The intuition in eq. 3.5 is straightforward: Di will monitor with a higher(lower) intensity as
her economic exposure to firm value grows(shrinks). She will monitor with a higher(lower)
intensity the larger(smaller) the attempted misappropriation is. Finally, Di will monitor
with a higher(lower) intensity as her cost of monitoring ci decreases(increases). Combining eq. 3.2 and eq. 3.5 allows us to express the optimal monitoring intensity under the
transparent regime in terms of the model’s parameters:

ei =

αi
.
αi + ci

(3.6)

Lemma 1. Under the transparent regime, expected firm value under D1 is always higher
than under D2 .
Proof of Lemma 1: Expected firm value loss under type i is given by (1 − ei )bi = (1 − ei )2 .
Since c1 < c2 and α1 ≥ α2 , eq. 3.6 implies e1 > e2 . Therefore, firm value loss under type 1
is lower, and firm value is higher.


Substituting eq. 3.6 into eq. 3.3, expected value loss under the transparent regime when
both types are equally can be expressed as:

E[Ltrans ] =

c1
α1 + c1

2


+
2
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c2
α2 + c2

2
(3.7)

It is important to note that under the transparent regime, D has no incentive to trade at
time t = 3 and will therefore withdraw from the market. Since all information regarding
her identity is public and therefore impounded into the share price, she can not derive any
trading gains stemming from an informational advantage. This is a manifestation of the
free-rider problem, where a potentially value increasing equilibrium cannot be achieved.
As I will now show, the free rider problem along with other value reducing frictions are
mitigated once hidden ownership is introduced.

3.2. Hidden regime
When both investor types choose to keep their position hidden, M cannot deduce which
type he is facing and therefore cannot adapt his choice of b accordingly. M will therefore
choose a single value of b regardless of Di ’s identity. This choice is bound to be sub-optimal
when facing any one type: it will be too low when facing the (relatively) inattentive type
2, and too high when facing (a relatively more vigilant) type 1:

hid

UM





b2
b2
1
b2
b2
1
(1 − e1 ) · (b − ) − e1 ·
+
(1 − e2 ) · (b − ) − e2 ·
= M ax
b
2
2
2
2
2
2

(3.8)

giving the optimum:

b=1−

e1 + e2
.
2

(3.9)

As is evident from eq. 3.9, since M is risk-neutral, his optimal choice depends only on
the average level of monitoring he faces. In other words, if monitoring intensities e1 , e2
are constant, M ’s average choice of b will be identical across the different regimes. The
expected firm value loss in this case is given by:

hid

E[L


i 1h
i 
1h
e1 + e2 2
hid
hid
]=
(1 − e1 )b
+
(1 − e2 )b
= 1−
.
2
2
2
11

(3.10)

hid ] < E[Ltrans ]. The assumpAs long as etrans
= ehid
i
i , and e1 6= e2 , we have that E[L

tion that each type’s monitoring intensity is unchanged between the different regimes is
unfounded, however: M ’s choice of b under the hidden regime is higher (lower) than it is
when facing type 1(2) under the transparent regime. As a result, type 1 will monitor with
greater intensity under the hidden regime than under the transparent regime, while type
2 will monitor with a lower intensity than under the transparent regime. This is because
regardless of the regime, Di ’s monitoring intensity is determined by the same relation as in
eq. 3.5.3
An insight into to exact mechanism at work here can be obtained by combining eq. 3.5 and
eq. 3.9 to arrive at the following condition:

ehid
=
i

αi (2 − e−i )
2ci + αi

(3.11)

where the subscript −i denotes the type other than i (if i = 1 then −i = 2 and viceversa). Eq. 3.11 highlights a distinctive feature stemming from the introduction of hidden
ownership: When choosing her optimal monitoring effort under the hidden regime, the
investor must now take into account M ’s beliefs regarding other possible investor types.
In other words, Di ’s monitoring decision depends on the beliefs M holds regarding D−i ’s
choice. Specifically, an increase (decrease) in monitoring effort by one type will induce a
decrease (increase) in effort from the other. Substituting in ehid
−i into eq. 3.11 allows us to
express ehid
only in terms of the model’s parameters α1 , α2 , c1 , c2 :
i

ehid
=
i

2αi c−i
α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2

3

.

(3.12)

As far as the investor is concerned, there is no qualitative difference between the regimes. Since her
utility function is the same, so is the relation defining her optimal choice of monitoring intensity.

12

Finally, plugging eq. 3.12 into eq. 3.10 yields the required expression for expected value
loss under the hidden regime.
Proposition 1. When trading is prohibited, and as long as c < c1 < c2 and α1 > α2 , the
hidden ownership regime strictly dominates the transparent ownership regime, as it pertains
to firm value.4 Formally, ∀ α1 , α2

s.t

α2 < α1 and ∀c1 , c2

E[Lhid ] < E[Ltrans ]

.

s.t.

c < c1 < c2 :

(3.13)

A full proof is in the appendix. The intuition behind this result is as follows: Expected firm
value under each type is affected by two factors: the fraction b that M tries to divert, and
the monitoring effort ei exerted by Di . Under D1 , who exerts a higher monitoring effort,
M ’s choice of b makes relatively little difference to expected firm value, since for a large
fraction of the time monitoring will be successful and the funds will be recovered. Under
D2 , who exerts less monitoring effort, M ’s choice of b has a stronger effect since those funds
are less likely to be recovered.
Since btrans
< bhid < btrans
, the hidden regime causes M to divert less than he would have
1
2
when facing D2 under the transparent regime (when a change in b has a large effect) and
more than he would have when facing D1 under the transparent regime (when a change in
b has a small effect).
When nature selects D1 , expected firm value is actually lower under the hidden regime.
Information asymmetry prevents D1 ’s ’reputation’ from attenuating the fraction of funds
M will try to divert. The opposite effect occurs when nature selects D2 - now the information
asymmetry masks D2 ’s relatively ineffective monitoring and causes M act too cautiously.
While D1 makes up for the loss of deterrence by monitoring more intensely, expected firm
value under D2 depends primarily on the reputation effect, as her monitoring is not very
4

In order to maintain tractability, I will assume the cost of monitoring ci is always above a minimum
level c. This will ensure that ∀i, 0 ≤ ehid
< 1. In other words, I assume the cost of monitoring is never so
i
low as to allow an investor to monitor with absolute accuracy.
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effective. In other words, firm value is more sensitive to M ’s choice of b when D2 is in
charge. The aggregate effect is of a smaller expected loss under the hidden regime.

3.3. The effect of trading
At time t = 3, the market opens and Di has an opportunity to adjust her total economic
exposure by buying/selling shares on the market. The market maker observes the aggregate
order flow, and sets a price Pe which represents his expectation of firm value conditional
on the order flow observed. Regardless of the market maker’s beliefs about the type he is
facing, this price will always fall somewhere between the expected price under type 1, P1 ,
and the expected price under type 2, P2 . Since e1 > e2 , expected firm value under type 1
is higher than it is under type 2 and therefore P1 ≥ Pe ≥ P2 .
In order for Di to gain from informed trading, her strategy must be twofold:
(i) Direction of trade: since P1 ≥ Pe , D1 can only profit by submitting a ’buy’ order,
profiting from the fact that the price set by the market maker may undervalue the firm. A
similar argument compels D2 to submit a ’sell’ order.
(ii) Size of trade: Because trading gains stem from information asymmetry, Di ’s order
size is bounded only by the requirement that her order divulges no information pertaining
to her identity. In other words, both types will trade (although is opposite directions)
the maximum fraction of shares that allows their trade to be disguised by the presence of
liquidity trading.
As mentioned in the introduction, the exact mechanism by which the derivatives position of
the investor is achieved is not the focus of this paper. When considering available liquidity,
however, I make the conservative assumption that the broker taking the other side of the
derivative position may in fact be holding an equivalent stake in the underlying asset in
order to hedge its position. In that case, households susceptible to the liquidity shock may
only be holding a fraction 1 − αi of the firm’s shares. Thus, any assertions regarding the

14

effect of liquidity become stronger still when this assumptions is discarded.
Following the liquidity shock, households will sell a fraction η(1 − αi ) or 0 with equal
probability. Define x1 , x2 as the respective fractions type 1 and 2 will trade. There are four
possible combinations of investor type and shock size, all occurring with equal probability:

Case 1: D1 buys x1 and households sell 0: aggregate flow is x1
Case 2: D1 buys x1 and households sell η(1 − α1 ): aggregate flow is x1 − η(1 − α1 )
Case 3: D2 sells x2 and households sell 0: aggregate flow is −x2
Case 4: D2 sells x2 and households sell η(1 − α2 ): aggregate flow is −x2 − η(1 − α2 )

Lemma 2. Under the hidden regime, when markets open, both types will choose to trade
equal amounts :
x1 = x2 = η2 (1 − α1 )

(3.14)

where η is the fraction of households affected by the liquidity shock and α1 is the fraction of
shares required to achieve an economic exposure equivalent to that of D10 s initial derivatives
position. D1 will submit an order to buy a fraction η2 (1 − α1 ) of the firm’s shares, while D2
will attempt to (short) sell the same fraction.

Proof of Lemma 2: Define Fi to be the aggregate order flow in case i (see cases 1-4 above)
and Pi to be the price the market maker sets after observing Fi . For any values 0 < x1 , x2 <
1 , the only two aggregate order flows that can in fact equate are F2 , F3 . Therefore in
equilibrium it must be that: −x2 = x1 − η(1 − α1 ), or equivalently that x1 + x2 = η(1 − α1 ).
This conditions implies that there are infinitely many combinations of x1 , x2 such that
0 ≤ x1 , x2 ≤ η(1 − α1 ) resulting in F2 = F3 . Also note that −η(1 − α1 ) ≤ F2 = F3 ≤ 0.
Equilibrium uniqueness can be guaranteed by specifying the following off-the-equilibriumpath beliefs for the market maker:
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Table 1

Order Flows and Market Prices
This first column lists all possible equilibrium outcomes of aggregate order flow. The second column
specifies the ingredients of each aggregate order flow. As is evident, identical order flow can result from
different combinations of orders submitted by the households (HH) and the investor (Di ) (column 2).
η is the liquidity parameter(fraction of households affected by the liquidity shock). α1 is the fraction of
shares required to achieve an economic exposure equivalent to that of D1 ’s initial derivatives position.
L is the expected firm value under D2 . H is the expected firm value under D1 . Intrinsic firm value
(depending on the type of investor involved) is shown in the second to last column. The market maker,
observing only aggregate order flow, sets the price (last column). Note that P2 < Pe < P1 always.
Order flow
η
(1 − α1 )
2

Transactions
η
D1 buys (1 − α1 )
2
HH sell 0

η
− (1 − α1 )
2
η
− (1 − α1 )
2
η
− (1 − α1 ) − η(1 − α2 )
2

Probability

Intrinsic Value

Market Price

1/4

H

P1

D1 buys

η
(1 − α1 )
2
HH sell η(1 − α1 )

1/4

H

Pe

D2 sells

η
(1 − α1 )
2
HH sell 0

1/4

L

Pe

η
(1 − α1 )
2
HH sell η(1 − α2 )

1/4

L

P2

D2 sells

If Fi > − η2 (1 − α1 ) then Pi = P1 where P1 is the expected share price when the investor is
of type 1.
If Fi < − η2 (1 − α1 ) then Pi = P2 where P2 is the expected share price when the investor is
of type 2.

These beliefs guarantee that type 1 will never submit a buy order where x1 >

η
2 (1

− α1 )

and similarly that type 2 will never submit a sell order where x2 > η2 (1 − α1 ). Since each
type strives to maximize order size, equilibrium can only be achieved when x1 = x2 =
η
2 (1

− α1 ).



Table 1 summarizes the possible order flows the market maker observes, and the prices set
in each instance.
The implication of lemma 2 is that the expected change in economic exposure caused by
trading in period t = 3 is symmetric about its previous mean (both types trade the same
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amount, albeit in different directions). In other words, trading does not change the expected
mean economic exposure of the investor, but rather its variance. While the effect of a change
in mean economic exposure on the manager’s decision and on firm value is clear cut5 , it
is less obvious what effect a change in variance alone (keeping the mean constant) would
have, given that the manager is assumed to be risk neutral.
Eq. 3.12 implies that D1 ’s decision regarding monitoring intensity under the hidden regime
is more sensitive to a change in her economic exposure than D2 ’s decision is. Moreover,
D1 ’s decision is also more sensitive to a change in the other type’s exposure than D2 ’s
decision is. This difference in sensitivity between investor types is driven by the difference
in monitoring costs ci the two types face. As a result, the symmetric equilibrium trade
described in lemma 2 will tend to increase the expected monitoring intensity M faces, and
compel M to choose a lower value for b than he would have chosen in the absence of trading.
The aggregate affect of the trading has on firm value is therefore a positive one.
Proposition 2. Under the hidden regime, the effect of trading on expected monitoring
intensity and on firm value V hid is always positive. Furthermore, an increase in the liquidity
parameter η will always result in increased expected monitoring, decreased fund diversion,
and increased firm value. Formally: ∀α1 , α2 s.t. α2 ≤ α1 , and ∀c1 , c2

s.t.

c < c1 <

c2 :
∂E[V hid ]
> 0,
∂η

∂bhid
> 0,
∂η

∂E[ehid ]
>0
∂η

.

(3.15)

A full proof is in the appendix. This result may seem counter intuitive at first: in the
presence of convex monitoring costs, the marginal change in monitoring intensity as a
function of economic exposure tends to decrease as exposure increases. This effect is evident
from equation 3.6 describing monitoring intensity under the transparent regime. Had this
effect retained its dominance when switching to the hidden regime, the introduction of
5
A higher mean economic exposure for the investor directly translates to a higher mean monitoring
intensity. This increase in mean monitoring intensity will in turn cause M to choose a lower value for b, all
else being equal. The aggregate effect will result in an increase in firm value.

17

trading as described in lemma 2 could - at least for part of the parameter space - cause a
decrease in expected monitoring intensity. However, the hidden regime introduces a new
set of considerations for the investor: each type now has to consider the manager’s beliefs
regarding the other type. For instance, if M believes D2 decreased her exposure (and
therefore decreased her monitoring intensity) he steals more, driving D1 to increase her
monitoring effort. Thus, having a higher economic exposure and a lower cost of monitoring,
D1 is more sensitive to changes in D2 ’s exposure (and resulting monitoring intensity) than
vice-versa. Therefore, a small decrease in ehid
will result in a relatively larger increase in
2
ehid
1 . On aggregate, the effect trading imparts on firm value under the hidden regime is
positive over the entire parameter space.
To conclude, hidden ownership can mitigate the free-rider problem by allowing investors
access to gains from informed trading. It then serves to magnify this effect by compelling
larger investors to ’compensate’ (monitoring-wise) for the partial or complete withdrawal
of smaller ones, in effect increasing the average monitoring intensity the manager faces,
thereby further increasing firm value.

3.4. Choice of regime
When faced with the decision of whether to disclose her economic interest in the firm or
keep it hidden, the investor first compares the effect each contingency (sub-game) has on her
personal welfare. I now turn to focus on characterizing the conditions leading the investor
to choose one regime over the other.
Disclosure of economic interest has two immediate effects on investor welfare. The first is
the forfeit of any trading gains: once the magnitude of her interest is made public and her
type subsequently deduced, the share price will immediately adjust to accurately reflect this
information, and the opportunity to trade on this information will be lost. Therefore, this
effect has negative consequences for both investor types and would compel both to hide their
ownership. The second channel through which the decision to disclose economic interest
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effects investor welfare is the ’signaling’ channel: by disclosing her economic interest, the
investor is in effect signaling her type, thereby influencing the manager’s choice of b. Unlike
the previous effect, this one presents opposite incentives to each type of investor. Because
btrans
< bhid < btrans
, D2 would prefer to hide her interest (and type), and D1 would prefer
1
2
to disclose it. While it is easy to see that disclosure of economic interest will never be
optimal for D2 , the decision becomes a little less clear cut in the case of D1 : on one hand,
disclosing her interest in the firm will cause an increase in expected firm value due to the
signaling effect. On the other hand, disclosure also implies the investor will have to forgo
the benefits of informed trading. The choice of optimal strategy for D1 must therefore
involve weighing these gains and losses and determining what the net effect of disclosure on
D1 ’s welfare would be.
Proposition 3. A pooling equilibrium where both investor types choose to hide their economic interest will occur whenever market liquidity is large enough relative to the initial
economic exposure of D1 . Formally:
∀α1 , α2 s.t. α2 < α1 , a pooling equilibrium where both investor types hide their ownership
stakes will occur whenever
η>

α1
1 − α1

.

(3.16)

Furthermore, for a given liquidity level η satisfying eq. 3.16 , firm value will increase as the
initial uncertainty regarding economic interest (α1 − α2 ) grows.
A full proof appears in the appendix. The reasoning behind this result is straightforward:
gains from trading increase in liquidity. The gains (and therefore the liquidity) required to
offset the decline in expected firm value resulting from hiding her type depends mostly on
D1 ’s exposure α1 to this decline. Therefore if the available liquidity is large enough relative
to the initial economic exposure of D1 , she will prefer to keep her interest in the firm hidden
and force a pooling equilibrium.
Two components are necessary for the opportunity of informed trading to arise: information
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asymmetry - in order to create mispricing, and sufficient liquidity - in order to exploit it.
Hidden ownership introduces information asymmetry in two separate dimensions: It creates
the asymmetry between the informed investor and other market participants, mitigating the
free-rider problem and driving informed investors to trade. Informed trading can lead to
better governance by increasing the investor’s incentives to monitor. More importantly,
hidden ownership creates an information asymmetry between the investor and the firm’s
management by injecting noise into the information management has regarding the monitoring intensity it faces, thus mitigating agency related frictions. Liquidity’s effect does not
end once the hidden regime is selected: under the hidden regime, an increase in liquidity
translates into an increase in firm value. The analysis therefore reveals an interesting complementarity involving hidden ownership and liquidity: Liquidity enables the practice of
hidden ownership, and hidden ownership for its part provides liquidity with a novel channel
through which it can have a positive effect on governance and firm value.
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CHAPTER 4 : Total Surplus
So far, the case has been made for the positive effects of hidden ownership on firm value.
In order to determine the circumstances, if any exist, under which the practice of hidden
ownership can be beneficial from a social planner’s perspective, the analysis must extend
to include its effects on the aggregate welfare of all involved.
The model contains three sources of surplus loss: the first is the specification attributing
decreasing returns to scale to a successful diversion of cash flow by M . This specification is
given in eq. 3.1 to be

b2
2.

The second source of surplus loss stems from the penalty imposed

on M when monitoring is successful. This loss is also given by eq. 3.1 to be
these two sources, we can therefore expect M to contribute a fraction

b2
2

b2
2.

Combining

to total surplus loss

regardless of whether monitoring is successful or not. The third and final source of surplus
loss is the monitoring cost borne by D, given in eq. 3.4 to be

ce2
2 .

This loss is also incurred

regardless of the outcome of the monitoring effort. I define the surplus loss attributed to M
as ψM and the loss attributed to D as ψD . Total surplus loss is defined as ψ = ψM + ψD .
Transparent regime
It is straightforward to show that for both investor types, monitoring intensity e decreases
in the monitoring cost parameter c. As ψD is an increasing function of both c and e, the
effect of c on ψD is not as obvious. The monitoring cost parameter c affects ψD both directly
and indirectly (through its effect on e). The two channels affect ψD in opposite directions,
and the overall influence of c on ψD therefore depends on which of the two channels is
dominant.
Lemma 3. Under the transparent regime, and for all c < c1 < c2 , 0 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 < 12 , an
increase in the monitoring cost parameter ci always reduces the surplus loss attributed to
monitoring ψDi .
A full proof is in the appendix. Since monitoring costs are linear in c but quadratic in e,
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the indirect effect of c on ψD is the dominant one. In other words, as the ’unit cost’ of
monitoring increases, the investor scales down her monitoring effort such that the overall
cost she incurs is lower than before.
Under both regimes, M ’s contribution ψM to expected surplus loss is increasing in c, as
b is increasing in c. Thus, although ψD is decreasing in c, total welfare loss under the
transparent regime is increasing as monitoring becomes increasingly expensive.
Lemma 4. Under the transparent regime, and for all c < c1 < c2 , 0 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 ≤ 1, an
increase in the monitoring cost parameter ci always increases total surplus loss ψ.
A full proof is in the appendix. Because ei and bi are linearly related under the transparent
regime, ci ’s effect on each is all but canceled out, and what remains as a decisive factor of
total surplus is ci ’s direct effect on ψD .
The investor’s initial economic interest αi on total surplus also has opposite effects in
each channel: larger exposure to firm value implies increased expected monitoring effort
and therefore increased expected monitoring costs. On the other hand, more monitoring
compels M to act in a more prudent manner, thereby reducing his contribution to welfare
loss. Once again, any assertion as to the identity of the dominant channel requires a closer
examination.
Lemma 5. Under the transparent regime, and for all c < c1 < c2 , 0 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 < 1, an
increase in the investor’s economic interest αi always decreases total surplus loss ψ.
A full proof is in the appendix. An increase in investor economic interest linearly increases her monitoring costs ψDi , but at the same time decreases manager related costs ψM
quadratically. the aggregate effect of an increase in αi on ψ under the transparent regime
is therefore negative.

22

Hidden regime
Under the hidden regime, changes to ci and αi produce the same effect (qualitatively) on
total surplus as they did under the transparent regime.
Proposition 4. For all c < c1 < c2 , 0 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 ≤

1
2

s.t. c2 > λc1 and λ ≥ λ, total

surplus is always higher under the hidden regime. Formally:
∀αL, αH , cL , cH s.t. 0 ≤ αL ≤ αH ≤

1
and c < cH < cL ,
2

ψ hid < ψ trans

.

(4.1)

A full proof is in the appendix. The intuition for this result is as follows: M ’s contribution
to surplus loss is b2/2 regardless of whether monitoring is successful or not. Therefore surplus
loss will be smaller when M is better deterred from diverting firm funds for personal use.
This formulation has the desirable quality that not unlike the real world, prevention is
cheaper and more efficient than corrective action after the fact. As for the investor, as long
as D2 monitoring cost parameter c2 is high enough when compared to c1 , the increased
costs of monitoring borne by D1 will be largely offset by the decreased monitoring costs
borne by D2 . One particular case where proposition 4 and all other propositions still apply
is when the cost of monitoring is prohibitively high for D2 , causing her to withdraw from
the market.
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CHAPTER 5 : Conclusion
This paper presents a model of investor intervention where investors employ a two-fold strategy: (i) monitor the firm’s management in order align its interests with those of shareholders
and increase firm value, and (ii) Create information asymmetry and then trade on private
information in public markets. To those ends, the means include disguising their engagement using different trading strategies and an increasingly accessible derivatives market.
The analysis yields the following results:
1. If stock markets are liquid, hidden ownership is likely to become more prevalent as it
allows investors to create information asymmetry and benefit from informed trading
that would be otherwise impossible. Informed trading, in turn, mitigates the free rider
problem thus indirectly contributing to better governance and higher firm value.
2. As the practice of hidden ownership becomes more prevalent, the firm’s management
faces increased uncertainty regarding the its potential monitors. This uncertainty is
further amplified by market liquidity, and can enforce a better alignment of interests
between the firm’s management and its shareholder constituency, resulting in higher
firm value and in some cases even increased total surplus.
3. For a given level of market liquidity, higher dispersion of (and therefore uncertainty
about) the monitoring cost parameter of potential investors can lead to higher efficiency and lower surplus loss due to frictions.

Informed trading in this model drives an increase in firm value not only through increased
expected monitoring (as discussed in previous literature) but also (and mainly) through
increasing the uncertainty management faces, better aligning its interests with those of
shareholders. In this setting, a liquid stock market not only contributes to firm value
through making hidden ownership more likely, but also continues to have a positive effect
on firm value conditional on hidden ownership already being in effect. For its part, hidden
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ownership contribution is two fold: it allows for the mitigation of the free rider problem, as
well as supplies a new channel through which liquidity can positively affect the corporate
governance mechanism, over and beyond evidence provided in previous literature. Contrary
to the popular opinion advocating complete transparency as a cure to all matters pertaining to corporate governance, this paper shows that under the right circumstances, hidden
ownership is one case where opacity can alleviate inherent frictions and benefit shareholders
as well as total surplus.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Expected firm value loss E[Ltrans ] is given by eq. 3.7 to be:

trans

E[L

]=

c1
α1 + c1

2


+

c2
α2 + c2

2

2

and expected firm value loss under the hidden regime E[Lhid ] is found by substituting eq.
3.12 into eq. 3.10 to be:

E[Lhid ] =

4c21 c22
(α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2 )2

To show that E[Ltrans > E[Lhid ], define:
c1
,
x=
α1 + c1

c2
y=
,
α2 + c2

√
2 2c1 c2
z=
.
α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2

Therefore, it suffices to show that x2 + y 2 > z 2 , or equivalently that: y 2 −

z2
z2
>
− x2 .
2
2

Applying the simple polynomial identity a2 − b2 = (a + b)(a − b) yields:


 



z
z
z
z
√
√
√
√
y−
>
+x
−x
y+
2
2
2
2

First, to establish that both sides of eq. A.1 are always positive, I show that
always.
To show:

y=

c2
2c1 c2
z
>
=√
α2 + c2
α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2
2
26

(A.1)

y>

√z
2

>x

divide by c2 and multiply diagonally to get:

α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2 > 2c1 α2 + 2c1 c2

or equivalently:

α1 c2 > α2 c1

Which always holds under the model assumptions α1 ≥ α2 and c1 < c2 .
To Show:

x=

2c1 c2
z
c1
<
=√
α1 + c1
α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2
2

divide by c1 and multiply diagonally to get:

α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2 < 2c2 α1 + 2c1 c2

yielding the same inequality as before:

α1 c2 > α2 c1

Which again always holds under the stated model assumptions.




z
z
> √ + x , and
Since lemma 1 already states that y > x, it follows that y + √
2
2
z
√
since I have already established that y > 2 > x, all that is required to complete the proof

 

√
z
z
is to show that y − √
> √ − x , or equivalently that x + y > 2 · z:
2
2
W.T.S.
x+y >
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√

2·z

c1
c2
4c1 c2
+
>
α1 + c1 α2 + c2
α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2

1
1
4
+ α2
> α1 α2
α1
+1
+1
+
+2
c1
c2
c1
c2
Change of variables (for simplification) yields:

1
1
4
+ >
m n
m+n

m+n m+n
+
>4
m
n

2+

Which always holds since

n
m
+
>2
m
n

n
m
+
>4
m
n
∀m > 0, n > 0

s.t.

m 6= n. And m 6= n always

since c1 < c2 and α1 ≥ α2 .


Proof of Proposition 2: Eq. 3.12 implies that the expected monitoring intensity under the
hidden regime is given by:

E[ehid ] =

hid
ehid
α2 c1 + α1 c2
1 + e2
=
2
α2 c1 + α1 c2 + 2c1 c2
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(A.2)

Define x = η2 (1−α1 ) the fraction of shares traded by the investor in equilibrium (see Lemma
2). Since α1 is a constant, any change to x is coming from η, and it is also obvious that
∂x
∂η

> 0. Therefore, we can consider changes in x to be a perfect proxy changes in η and use

x instead of η in our sensitivity analysis.
After trading, type 1 will have an economic exposure equivalent to holding a fraction α1 + x
of the shares while type 2 will have exposure equivalent to a fraction α2 − x of the shares.
By eq. A.2 the expected level of monitoring will then become:

E[ehid ] =

(α2 − x)c1 + (α1 + x)c2
(α2 − x)c1 + (α1 + x)c2 + 2c1 c2

Taking a FOC with respect to x yields:

2c1 c2 (c2 − c1 )
∂E[ehid ]
=
∂x
((α2 − x)c1 + (α1 + x)c2 + 2c1 c2 )2

And since c2 > c1 we get:
∂E[ehid ]
>0
∂x

(A.3)

Since the average level of monitoring increases in liquidity, and since the optimal amount
the M diverts bhid decreases in the average level of monitoring (see eq. 3.9), it follows that
bhid is decreasing in liquidity :
∂bhid
<0
∂x

(A.4)

From eq. 3.9 and eq. 3.10 we can see that the expected value loss under the hidden regime
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is
E[L

hid



2
e1 + e2 2
= bhid
]= 1−
2

Therefore eq. A.4 implies that
∂E[Lhid ]
<0
∂x

(A.5)

and since expected firm value can be expressed as 1 − E[Lhid ], we arrive at the desired
result.


Proof of Proposition 3: I have already established that D2 will always prefer to hide her
ownership (disclosure results in the loss of gains from informed trading as well as a loss of
“deterrence” stemming from being identified as a relatively ’weak’ monitor).
For D1 to prefer hidden ownership, I must show her utility is higher when hiding than
when choosing to disclose. D1 ’s disclosure decision revolves around comparing potential
gains from informed trading (under the hidden regime) to the value lost from decreased
deterrence (M would divert less if D1 were to disclose her ownership).
When D1 chooses to (verifiably) disclose her ownership, M can infer her type and therefore
optimize the fraction b diverted to be btrans
= 1−etrans
as in eq. 3.2. Under this transparent
1
1
regime, D1 optimizes her monitoring intensity according to eq. 3.6 to be etrans
=
1

α1
α1 +c1 .

Note that under this regime, no trading will occur as the market price will be fully revealing.
D1 ’s utility is then given by:

trans
UD
= α1 (1 − btrans
(1 − etrans
)) −
1
1
1
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c1 (etrans
)2
α2 (2α1 + 3c1 )
1
= 1
2
2(α1 + c1 )2

(A.6)

When D1 instead elects to keep her interest in the firm hidden, she will have the opportunity
to buy an additional fraction x of shares (where x is given by lemma 2) over and above
her initial stake α1 , in effect giving her a total economic exposure equivalent to holding a
fraction α1 + x of all outstanding shares.
I will first derive the required result under the assumption that α2 > x, and later for the
case where α2 ≤ x. (when α2 ≤ x, D2 will not engage in monitoring at all ehid
2 = 0).

Case 1

W hen

α2 > x:

ehid
is given by eq. 3.12 to be:
1
ehid
1 =

2(α1 + x)c2
(α1 + x)c2 + (α2 − x)c1 + 2c1 c2

(A.7)

ehid
2 =

2(α2 − x)c1
(α1 + x)c2 + (α2 − x)c1 + 2c1 c2

(A.8)

and similarily ehid
is
2

Follwing eq. 3.9, bhid can then be expressed as

bhid =

2c1 c2
(α1 + x)c2 + (α2 − x)c1 + 2c1 c2

(A.9)

The price Pe set by the market maker under the hidden regime is a price reflecting the
expected firm value, taking into account the fact that both investor types are equally likely:

Pe =

hid (1 − ehid ))
(1 − bhid (1 − ehid
1 )) + (1 − b
2
2

Therefore, D1 ’s utility under the hidden regime can be expressed as:
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hid
UD
= (α1 + x)(1 − bhid (1 − ehid
1 )) −
1

2
c1 (ehid
1 )
− x · Pe =
2

= { α13 c22 + 2c21 c2 x(x − α2 ) + 2α12 c2 (α2 c1 + 2c1 c2 + x(c2 − c1 )) +
+ α1 [α22 c21 + 2α2 c1 (c1 c2 + x(c2 − c1 )) + x(2c1 c2 (2c2 − x) + c22 x − c21 (2c2 − x))] }/
/

((α2 − x)c1 + (α1 + x)c2 + 2c1 c2 )2

W.T.S.

hid
UD
1

∀α1 , α2 , c1 , c2 , x

>
s.t.

trans
UD
1

α1 ≥ α2 ,

(A.10)

1
c2 > c1 ≥ ,
2

x≥

α1
.
2

Multiplying both sides of eq. A.10 by 2(α1 +c1 )2 (α2 c1 +α1 c2 +2c1 c2 −c1 x+c2 x)2 , expanding
both sides and then subtracting the following common elements:

(2α13 α22 c21 + 3α12 α22 c31 + 4α14 α2 c1 c2 + 4α13 α2 c1 c2 x + 12α12 α2 c31 c2 + 18α13 c21 c22 + 12α13 α2 c21 c2
+14α13 c1 c22 x − 12α13 c21 c2 x + 12α12 c31 c2 x + 12α12 c21 c22 x − 4α13 α2 c21 x + 8α12 c31 c22 + 11α14 c1 c22
−4α14 c1 c2 x + 2α15 c22 − 4α12 c21 c2 x2 − 4α13 c1 c2 x2 + 4α14 c22 x + 3α12 c31 x2 + 3α12 c1 c22 x2
+2α13 c22 x2 + +2α13 c21 x2 − 6α12 α2 c31 x + 4α12 α2 c21 c2 x)

from both sides yields:

α12 α22 c31 + 2α1 α22 c41 + 4α1 α2 c41 c2 + α14 c1 c22 − 2α12 α2 c31 x − 4α1 α2 c41 x − 4α1 α2 c31 c2 x
−4α1 c41 c2 x − 4α2 c41 c2 x + 2α13 c1 c22 x + 8α12 c21 c22 x + 8α1 c31 c22 x + α12 c31 x2 + 2α1 c41 x2
+4α1 c31 c2 x2 + 4c41 c2 x2 + α12 c1 c22 x2 + 2α1 c21 c22 x2

>

2α13 α2 c21 c2 + 2α13 c21 c22 + 4α12 c31 c22 − 2α13 c21 c2 x + 2α12 α2 c21 c2 x − 2α12 c21 c2 x2
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(A.11)

Dividing eq. A.11 by c1 and moving all elements to LHS yields:
α12 α22 c21 + 2α1 α22 c31 + 4α1 α2 c31 c2 + α14 c22 − 2α12 α2 c21 x − 4α1 α2 c31 x − 4α1 α2 c21 c2 x
−4α1 c31 c2 x − 4α2 c31 c2 x + 2α13 c22 x + 8α12 c1 c22 x + 8α1 c21 c22 x + α12 c21 x2 + 2α1 c31 x2
+4α1 c21 c2 x2 + 4c31 c2 x2 + α12 c22 x2 + 2α1 c1 c22 x2 − 2α13 α2 c1 c2 − 2α13 c1 c22
−4α12 c21 c22 + 2α13 c1 c2 x − 2α12 α2 c1 c2 x + 2α12 c1 c2 x2

>

(A.12)

0

Eq. A.12 can be re-written as:

α1 (−α2 c1 + α1 c2 )(α12 c2 − α1 c1 (α2 + 2c2 ) − 2c21 (α2 + 2c2 ))
+2(−α1 α2 c21 (α1 + 2c1 ) − c1 (α12 (−α1 + α2 ) + 2α1 α2 c2
+2(α1 + α2 )c21 )c2 + α1 (α1 + 2c1 )2 c22 )x
+(2c21 + α1 (c1 + c2 ))(2c1 c2 + α1 (c1 + c2 ))x2

>

0

(A.13)

I will now show that the sum of the terms multiplied by x in eq. A.13 is positive:
The sum of elements multiplied by x in eq. A.13 is:
2(−α1 α2 c21 (α1 + 2c1 ) − c1 (α12 (−α1 + α2 ) + 2α1 α2 c2 + 2(α1 + α2 )c21 )c2 + α1 (α1 + 2c1 )2 c22 )
and can be rewritten as:

2(−α12 α2 c21 − 2α1 α2 c31 + α13 c1 c2 − α12 α2 c1 c2 − 2α1 α2 c21 c2 − 2α1 c31 c2
−2α2 c31 c2 + α13 c22 + 4α12 c1 c22 + 4α1 c21 c22 )

Using the constraints c2 > c1 and α1 ≥ α2 it is straightforward to show that:
4α1 c21 c22 − 2α1 c31 c2 − 2α2 c31 c2 ≥ 0 and
α13 c1 c2 − α12 α2 c21 ≥ 0 and
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(A.14)

4α12 c1 c22 − 2α1 α2 c31 − 2α1 α2 c21 c2 ≥ 0 and
α13 c1 c2 − α12 α2 c21 ≥ 0
and therefore that the sum of terms multiplied by x is non-negative.
It is also evident from eq. A.13 that the sum of terms multiplied by x2 is non-negative.
α2
α1
and 1 respectively since this will
Therefore, x and x2 in eq. A.13 can be replaced by
2
4
α1
only make LHS smaller (remember that x ≥
is one of the original constraints).
2
Eq. A.13 can therefore be expressed as:
α1
[(α1 − 2α2 )2 c21 (α1 + 2c1 ) + 2(α1 − 2α2 )c1 (3α12 + 2α1 c1 − 2c21 )c2 + α12 (9α1 + 10c1 )c22 ]
4

>

0

(A.15)
Multiplying eq. A.15 by

4
and expanding yields:
α1

α13 c21 − 4α12 α2 c21 + 4α1 α22 c21 + 2α12 c31 − 8α1 α2 c31
+8α22 c31 + 6α13 c1 c2 − 12α12 α2 c1 c2 + 4α12 c21 c2 − 8α1 α2 c21 c2
−4α1 c31 c2 + 8α2 c31 c2 + 9α13 c22 + 8α12 c1 c22 + 2α12 c1 c22

≥

0

(A.16)

Once again, using the original constraints c2 > c1 and 2α2 ≥ 2x ≥ α1 ≥ α2 it is straightforward to show that:
8α12 c1 c22 − 8α1 α2 c21 c2 ≥ 0 and
2α12 c31 + 8α22 c31 + 4α12 c21 c2 − 8α1 α2 c31 ≥ 0 and
8α2 c31 c2 − 4α1 c31 c2 ≥ 0 and
9α13 c22 + 6α13 c1 c2 + 2α12 c1 c22 − 12α12 α2 c1 c2 − 4α12 α2 c21 ≥ 0. Therefore, eq. A.16 holds.
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Case 2

W hen

x ≥ α2 :

In this case, D2 will monitor with intensity zero (ehid
= 0), as her position after trading
2
will be either neutral or short.

ehid
is given by eq. 3.11 to be:
1
2α1
2c1 + α1

ehid
1 =

(A.17)

Follwing eq. 3.9, bhid can then be expressed as

bhid = 1 −

e1
α1
2c1
=1−
=
2
2c1 + α1
2c1 + α1

(A.18)

The price Pe set by the market maker under the hidden regime is a price reflecting the
expected firm value, taking into account the fact that both investor types are equally likely:

Pe =

hid (1 − ehid ))
(1 − bhid (1 − ehid
1 )) + (1 − b
2
2

Therefore, D1 ’s utility under the hidden regime can be expressed as:

hid
UD
=
1

α1 (α1 + x)(α1 + x + 4c1 )
(α1 + x + 2c1 )2

(A.19)

W.T.S.

hid
UD
1

∀α1 , α2 , c1 , c2 , x

>
s.t.

Multiplying both sides of eq. A.20 by

trans
UD
1

α1 ≥ α2 ,

1
c2 > c1 ≥ ,
2

x≥

α1
.
2

(A.20)

2
(α1 + c1 )2 (α1 + 2c1 + x)2 , expanding both sides
α1
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and then subtracting

2α14 + 11α13 c1 + 20α12 c21 + 12α1 c31 + 4α13 x + 14α12 c1 x + 12α1 c21 x + 2α12 x + 3α1 c1 x2

from both sides yields:

α13 c1 + 2α12 c1 x + 8α1 c21 x − 2α12 c21 + 8c31 x − 4α1 c31 + α1 c1 x2 + 2c21 x2 > 0

Under the assumption of

x>

(A.21)

α1
, it is straightforward to show
2

8α1 c21 x − 2α12 c21 > 0
and

8c31 x − 4α1 c31 ≥ 0.
The rest of LHS is non-negative.


Proof of Lemma 3: W.T.S.: Under the transparent regime, and for all c < c1 < c2 , 0 ≤
α2 ≤ α1 < 21 , an increase in the monitoring cost parameter ci always reduces the surplus
∂ψDi
loss attributed to monitoring ψDi . In other words,
< 0.
∂ci
ci e2i
αi
. Furthermore, under the transparent regime, ei =
.
2
αi + ci

2
1
αi
= ci
.
2
αi + ci

By definition, ψDi =
Therefore, ψDi
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Taking a first order condition with respect to ci :
∂ψDi
∂ci

1
=
2




αi2 (αi + ci )2 − ci αi2 (2αi + 2ci )
.
(αi + ci )4

Since the denominator is always positive, it is sufficient to show that:
αi2 (αi + ci )2 − ci αi2 (2αi + 2ci ) < 0. Dividing by (αi + ci ) yields:
αi2 (αi + ci ) − 2ci αi2 < 0,

or equivalently
αi3 − ci αi < 0.

Dividing by αi2 leaves αi − ci < 0 which always holds since by assumption: αi <

1
≤ ci .
2


Proof of Lemma 4: W.T.S.: Under the transparent regime, and for all c < c1 < c2 , 0 ≤
α2 ≤ α1 ≤ 1, an increase in the monitoring cost parameter ci always increases expected
∂ψ
total surplus loss ψ. In other words,
> 0.
∂ci
Under the transparent regime,

ψ = ψD + ψM





αi2
c2i
1 ci αi2 + c2i
1
ci
+
=
,
=
2
(αi + ci )2 (αi + ci )2
2 (αi + ci )2

and therefore:



∂ψ
1 (αi2 + 2ci )(αi + ci )2 − (2αi + 2ci )(ci αi2 + c2i )
=
.
∂ci
2
(αi + ci )4
Since the denominator is always positive, it is sufficient to show that:
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(αi2 + 2ci )(αi + ci )2 − (2αi + 2ci )(ci αi2 + c2i ) > 0.
Dividing by (αi + ci ) and expanding:

αi3 + 2ci αi − ci αi2 > 0.
Dividing by αi yields
αi2 + 2ci − ci αi > 0,
or equivalently
αi2 > ci (αi − 2).
Since αi ≤ 1, the RHS is negative and the required result is obtained.



Proof of Lemma 5: W.T.S.: Under the transparent regime, and for all c < c1 < c2 , 0 ≤
α2 ≤ α1 < 1, an increase in the investor’s economic interest αi always decreases expected
total surplus loss ψ.
Equivalently, need to show that

∂ψ
< 0.
∂αi

Under the transparent regime,

ψ = ψD + ψM =





1
αi2
c2i
1 ci αi2 + c2i
ci
+
=
,
2
(αi + ci )2 (αi + ci )2
2 (αi + ci )2

and therefore:



∂ψ
1 2ci αi (αi + ci )2 − (2αi + 2ci )(ci αi2 + c2i )
=
.
∂αi
2
(αi + ci )4
Since the denominator is always positive, it is sufficient to show that:
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2ci αi (αi + ci )2 − (2αi + 2ci )(ci αi2 + c2i ) < 0.

Dividing by 2(αi + ci ) and expanding yields:

ci αi2 + c2i αi < ci αi2 + c2i .

or equivalently;
αi < 1.



Proof of Proposition 4: W.T.S.: For all c < c1 < c2 , 0 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 ≤

1
2

s.t. c2 > λc1 and

λ ≥ λ, expected total surplus is always higher under the hidden regime.
I first derive the expressions for expected surplus loss under each regime and then show
that it is always smaller under the hidden regime. Surplus loss stems from M ’s socially
inefficient diversion of funds, and from D’s costly monitoring effort.
Transparent regime
Eq. 3.1 gives M ’s utility under the transparent regime. It is straightforward to see that
b2
regardless of whether monitoring is successful or not, M contributes
to surplus loss, either
2
through decreasing returns to scale when diversion is successful, or through the penalty he
receives when it is not. Therefore, when facing Di ,

ψMi =

b2i
c2i
=
.
2
2(αi + ci )2
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Since both investor types are equally likely,

ψM





1
c21
c22
1 b21 b22
=
+
.
=
+
2 2
2
2 2(α1 + c1 )2 2(α2 + c2 )2

D’s contribution to surplus loss comes only from the costly monitoring she undertakes,
therefore
ψDi =

ci e2i
αi2 ci
=
.
2
2(αi + ci )2

And since both investor types are equally likely,


1
α12 c1
α22 c2
ψD =
+
.
2 2(α1 + c1 )2 2(α2 + c2 )2

Therefore, the expected total surplus loss under the transparent regime can be expressed
as
ψ = ψM



1 c1 (α12 + c1 ) c2 (α22 + c2 )
+
.
+ ψD =
4 (α1 + c1 )2
(α2 + c2 )2

(A.22)

Hidden regime
Using eq. 3.9 and 3.12 and taking the trading period into account, we can express M ’s
b2
contribution to surplus loss,
as
2

ψM =



2c21 c22




2

 (α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2 − c1 x + c2 x)


W hen

x < α2










W hen

x ≥ α2 .

2c21
(α1 + x + 2c1 )2
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Using eq. 3.12 and keeping in mind both investor types are equally likely, the expected
surplus loss directly attributed to the investor is:

ψD =



c1 c2 (α12 c2 + α22 c1 + 2α1 c2 x − 2α2 c1 x + (c1 + c2 )x2 )





(α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2 − c1 x + c2 x)2



W hen

x < α2






c1 (α1 + x)2



(α1 + x + 2c1 )2

W hen

x ≥ α2 .

Therefore,

ψ = ψM + ψD =


 c1 c2 (α12 c2 + α22 c1 + 2c1 c2 + 2α1 c2 x − 2α2 c1 x + (c1 + c2 )x2 )




(α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2 − c1 x + c2 x)2



W hen

x < α2






c1 (α1 + x)2 + 2c21



(α1 + x + 2c1 )2

W hen

x ≥ α2 .
(A.23)

Case 1: x ≥ α2
W.T.S.


1 c1 (α12 + c1 ) c2 (α22 + c2 )
c1 (α1 + x)2 + 2c21
+
≥
4 (α1 + c1 )2
(α2 + c2 )2
(α1 + x + 2c1 )2

(A.24)

Multiplying both sides by 4(α1 + c1 )2 (α2 + c2 )2 (α1 + x + 2c1 )2 and moving all terms to LHS,
we get:
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−3α14 α22 c1 − 7α12 α22 c21 − 4α13 α22 c21 − 12α1 α22 c31 − 4α22 c41
+α14 α22 c2 − 6α14 α2 c1 c2 + 6α13 α22 c1 c2 − 14α12 α2 c21 c2 − 8α13 α2 c21 c2
+13α12 α22 c21 c2 − 24α1 α2 c31 c2 + 12α1 α22 c31 c2 − 8α2 c41 c2 + 4α22 c41 c2
+α14 c22 + 6α13 c1 c22 − 3α14 c1 c22 + 6α12 c21 c22 − 4α13 c21 c22
−6α13 α22 c1 x + 2α1 α22 c21 x − 12α12 α22 c21 x + 4α22 c31 x − 8α1 α22 c31 x
+2α13 α22 c2 x − 12α13 α2 c1 c2 x + 8α12 α22 c1 c2 x + 4α1 α2 c21 c2 x

(A.25)

−24α12 α2 c21 c2 x + 10α1 α22 c21 c2 x + 8α2 c31 c2 x − 16α1 α2 c31 c2 x
+4α22 c31 c2 x + 2α13 c22 x + 8α12 c1 c22 x − 6α13 c1 c22 x + 12α1 c21 c22 x
−12α12 c21 c22 x + 8c31 c22 x − 8α1 c31 c22 x − 3α12 α22 c1 x2 + α22 c21 x2
−8α1 α22 c21 x2 − 4α22 c31 x2 + α12 α22 c2 x2 − 6α12 α2 c1 c2 x2 + 2α1 α22 c1 c2 x2
+2α2 c21 c2 x2 − 16α1 α2 c21 c2 x2 + α22 c21 c2 x2 − 8α2 c31 c2 x2 + α12 c22 x2
+2α1 c1 c22 x2 − 3α12 c1 c22 x2 + 2c21 c22 x2 − 8α1 c21 c22 x2 − 4c31 c22 x2

≥

0

Note that the highest power of c2 in eq. A.25 is 2. I will now show that the sum of elements
multiplying c22 in eq. A.25 is strictly positive:
W.T.S.

α14 + 6α13 c1 − 3α14 c1 + 6α12 c21 − 4α13 c21
+2α13 x + 8α12 c1 x − 6α13 c1 x + 12α1 c21 x

(A.26)

−12α12 c21 x + 8c31 x − 8α1 c31 x + α12 x2
+2α1 c1 x2 − 3α12 c1 x2 + 2c21 x2 − 8α1 c21 x2 − 4c31 x2

>

0

1
Using the constraints 0 < α1 ≤ , x ≤ 1, it is straight forward to show that:
2
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8c31 x − 8α1 c31 x − 4c31 x2 ≥ 0 and
6α1 c21 x − 12α12 c21 x ≥ 0 and
6α1 c21 x + 2c21 x2 − 8α1 c21 x2 ≥ 0 and
2α12 c21 − 4α13 c21 ≥ 0 and
6α13 c1 − 3α14 c1 ≥ 0 and
3α12 c1 x − 6α13 c1 x ≥ 0 and
2α1 c1 x2 − 3α12 c1 x2 ≥ 0
Subtracting these 7 equations from eq. A.26 leaves:

α14 + 4α12 c21 + 2α13 x + 5α12 c1 x + α12 x2

>

0

1
Which always holds under the constraints 0 < α1 ≤ , x ≤ 1.
2
Now that I’ve shown that the sum of multipliers of c22 in eq. A.25 is strictly positive, it
follows that there is always c2 large enough to make eq. A.25 hold under proposition 4’s
1
constraints. Formally, ∀α1 , α2 , c1 s.t. c ≤ c1 < c2 , 0 ≤ α2 ≤ α1 ≤ , α1 > 0, there
2
always exists a c2 s.t. eq. A.25 holds.
Case 2: x < α2
W.T.S.


1 c1 (α12 + c1 ) c2 (α22 + c2 )
+
4 (α1 + c1 )2
(α2 + c2 )2

≥
(A.27)

c1 c2 (α12 c2

+

α22 c1

+ 2c1 c2 + 2α1 c2 x − 2α2 c1 x + (c1 + c2
(α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2 − c1 x + c2 x)2
43

)x2 )

Using the same method as in case 1, I start by multiplying both sides by 4(α1 + c1 )2 (α2 +
c2 )2 (α1 c2 + α2 c1 + 2c1 c2 − c1 x + c2 x)2 and moving all elements to LHS. In this case the
highest power of c2 is 4. I will now show that the sum of elements multiplying c42 is strictly
positive under the constraints, and therefore that eq. A.28 holds.
Isolating only the elements that multiply c42 , we get:
α14 + 6α13 c1 − 3α14 c1 + 6α12 c21 − 4α13 c21 + 2α13 x + 8α12 c1 x
−6α13 c1 x + 12α1 c21 x − 12α12 c21 x + 8c31 x − 8α1 c31 x

(A.28)

+α12 x2 + 2α1 c1 x2 − 3α12 c1 x2 + 2c21 x2 − 8α1 c21 x2 − 4c31 x2 > 0

1
Using the constraints 0 < α1 ≤ , x ≤ 1, it is straight forward to show that:
2
8c31 x − 8α1 c31 x − 4c31 x2 ≥ 0 and
6α1 c21 x − 12α12 c21 x ≥ 0 and
6α1 c21 x + 2c21 x2 − 8α1 c21 x2 ≥ 0 and
6α12 c21 − 4α13 c21 ≥ 0 and
6α13 c1 − 3α14 c1 ≥ 0 and
2α1 c1 x2 − 3α12 c1 x2 ≥ 0 and
8α12 c1 x − 6α13 c1 x ≥ 0.
Subtracting these 7 equations from eq. A.28 leaves:

α14 + 2α13 x + α12 x2 > 0
1
Which always holds under the constraints 0 < α1 ≤ , x ≤ 1.
2
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